A trust-based defence scheme for mitigating blackhole and selective forwarding attacks in the RPL routing protocol

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Other Title

Authors

Airehrour, David
Gutierrez, J.
Ray, S. K.

Author ORCID Profiles (clickable)

Degree

Grantor

Date

2018-03-30

Supervisors

Type

Journal Article

Ngā Upoko Tukutuku (Māori subject headings)

Keyword

routing protocol for low-power and lossy networks (RPL)
Internet of Things (IoT)
blackhole attacks
selective forwarding attacks
AS-XM 1000
trust-based RPL
standard RPL
IoT

ANZSRC Field of Research Code (2020)

Citation

Airehrour, D., Gutierrez, J., & Ray, S.K. (2018). A Trust-based Defence Scheme for Mitigating Blackhole and Selective Forwarding Attacks in the RPL Routing Protocol. Australian Journal of Telecommunications and the Digital Economy, 6(1), 41-59. doi:10.18080/ajtde.v6n1.138

Abstract

The routing protocol for low-power and lossy networks (RPL) has gained prominence as the standard IoT routing protocol. However, it faces like many other routing protocols diverse attacks. Many studies have been proposed to secure the RPL protocol, and simulation studies have been put forward as the main research method, while testbed experiments, though an authentic research and testing method, have been ignored. Although testbed experiments and simulation studies have their strengths and limitations, testbed techniques could be used as a verifiable validation method for simulation studies. This study is a follow up research work to validate our simulation study, which addressed Blackhole attacks in the RPL routing protocol. In addition, Selective Forwarding attacks are also addressed. It implements a testbed while embedding our Trust-based RPL protocol and the standard RPL protocol in a smart environment configuration. Based on the test experiments, we provide a proof-of-concept of the validity of our claim that our Trust-based RPL protocol provides a comprehensive defence (simulation and testbed) against Blackhole and Selective Forwarding attacks.

Publisher

TelSoc : Telecommunications and the Digital Economy

Link to ePress publication

DOI

doi:10.18080/ajtde.v6n1.138

Copyright holder

Copyright Telecommunications Association Inc

Copyright notice

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

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